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Abstract
Is there any return to education in criminal activities? This paper is one of the
first to investigate whether education has not only a positive impact on legitimate,
but also on illegitimate activities. We use as a case study one of the longest running
criminal corporations in history: the Italian-American mafia. Its most successful
members were capable businessmen, orchestrating crimes that required abilities that
might be learned at school: extracting the optimal rent when setting up a racket,
weighting interests against default risk when starting a loan sharking business or
organizing supply chains, logistics and distribution when setting up a drug dealing
system. We address this question by comparing mobsters to a variety of samples
drawn from the United States 1940 Population Census, including a sample of their
closest (non-mobster) neighbors. We document that mobsters have one year less
education than their neighbors on average. We find that mobsters have significant
returns to education of 7.5-8.5 percent, which is only slightly smaller than their
neighbors and 2-5 percentage points smaller than for U.S.-born men or male citi-
zens. Mobster returns were consistently about twice as large as a sample of Italian
immigrants or immigrants from all origin countries. Within that, those charged with
complex crimes including embezzlement and bookmaking have the highest returns.
We conclude that private returns to education exist even in the illegal activities
characterized by a certain degree of complexity as in the case of organized crime in
mid-twentieth century United States.
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1 Introduction
Additional years of education are known to increase earnings in legitimate labor activities.
But, what about illegal ones? In this study we will not discuss the activities of common
criminals. Our focus is professional criminals who belonged to one of the most successful
and long-lasting criminal organizations: the Italian-American mafia between the 1930s
and the 1960s. We match a list set up by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) of
712 mobsters belonging to the Italian-American mafia with the 1940 United States (U.S.)
Census of Population. This gives us information about income, housing values, education,
job characteristics, as well as the precise address of residence for each individual. We
create a sample of white, male, similarly aged, neighbors of these mobsters that serves as
the closest comparison group and we also present estimated returns to education for other
samples drawn from the 1940 Census, including all working-age white men; whites born in
the U.S.; all U.S. citizens; all immigrants; all Italian immigrants; and second-generation
Italians (who are born in the U.S. but have at least one parent born in Italy).
Economists have shown that increased levels of education reduce criminal participa-
tion. This implies that education is valued more by legitimate firms than by illegitimate
ones. This is consistent with our first finding: mafia mobsters have on average one less
year of education when compared to the sample of neighbors.
But, this finding does not imply that annualized returns to education are smaller for
organized crime members than for ordinary workers. Criminal careers are known to start
very early and are likely to be interwoven with schooling choices. Individuals who choose
to be part of the mafia are likely to trade off income and power for risk of injury, prison,
and death.
This alone, without the need of lower returns to education, would predict a lower
investment in education as there would be fewer years of working life in which to recoup
foregone wages (Mincer, 1974). Indeed, economic theory predicts that individuals with
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lower (working) life expectancy should have larger annualized returns to education.
This is true unless the extra schooling is not marketable. So, is schooling marketable
in the mafia? This question really involves the mafia’s complex business model and the
link between human capital and schooling. Let us start with the latter. If one takes
Bowles and Gintis (2002)’s view that schools “prepare people for adult work rules, by
socializing people to function well (and without complaint) in the hierarchical structure
of the modern corporation” it would seem that schools are an ideal training environment
for aspiring mobsters.
While we do not fully embrace this view of schooling, many of the skills students ac-
quire at school are likely to be useful when setting up a racket (i.e. extracting the optimal
rent), a loan sharking business (i.e. weighting interests against default risks), a drug deal-
ing system (i.e. setting up supply chains), etc. It is ultimately an empirical question as
to whether the returns to education in the mafia are similar to the ones ordinary workers
enjoy. This comparison, we believe, is also informative about the workings of the mafia.
The results presented below hold, we argue, for criminals engaged in complex criminal
activities, but may not be more generally true of petty criminals or criminals operating
at the lowest levels of criminal organizations, whose everyday tasks are much simpler and
do not involve the planning, risk evaluation, and communication skills needed of those
higher in the network. We are therefore providing a counterpoint to Carvalho and Soares
(forthcoming), and Levitt and Venkatesh (2000), who study the characteristics of regular
gang members.
We estimate Mincer-type regressions using log income and log housing value as the
main outcomes. The main independent variable of interest is years of education. We
present results for the mobster sample and compare to other reasonable comparison
groups: all men; U.S. citizens; immigrants; Italian immigrants and second-generation
Italian men; and a sample of mobster neighbors, who lived on the same block (and usu-
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ally the same exact street) in 1940.
We find large returns to education within the mafia, no matter the model, or the
outcome variable, that we use. This shows that private returns to education exist not
only in legitimate but also in the illegitimate activities that imply a sufficient degree of
complexity. Mobster returns (in terms of income) to a year of schooling are around 7.5-
8.5 percent, compared to 9-10 percent for the neighbor sample and 10.5-13 percent for
the U.S. born and U.S. citizen samples. Interestingly, mobster returns are substantially
larger than we find for the immigrant and, especially, the Italian immigrant, samples,
while they are only about one percentage point higher than we find for second-generation
Italians. Moreover, for mobsters who, according to the FBN records, were involved in
white-collar crimes or in crimes that require running an illegal business (i.e., racketeering,
loan sharking, bootlegging, etc.) we find returns to education that are about three times
as large as for those who are involved in violent crimes (i.e., robberies, murders, etc.).
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic attempt to estimate the returns to
education in criminal activities and provides intuitive insights into the workings of complex
criminal gangs such as the mafia and into the factors considered by those deciding to
become criminals in the first place. Carvalho and Soares (forthcoming) provide some
evidence on the returns to education for low level Rio de Janeiro gang members but it is
not the main focus of their study.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss the existing literature on education and
crime, before providing a brief overview of the history of mafia organizations and members
in the U.S. before 1960. We then present our novel dataset as well as our comparison
samples drawn from the U.S. Census. We then discuss the empirical methodology before
finally presenting our results, discussing mechanisms, and concluding.
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2 Literature Review
This section discusses both the existing literature analyzing the impact of education on
crime and the recent and historical literature measuring the returns to education, provid-
ing context to the analysis presented below.
Education has been relatively neglected by economists as a channel that might in-
fluence both criminal proceeds and the incentive to engage in crime. Most of the (quite
recent) literature on this topic finds that education reduces crime through different poten-
tial channels: first of all, education increases the opportunity cost of the legitimate labor
market and, if arrested, of the lost time spent in jail, thus making it more costly to engage
in criminal activities (“deterrence” mechanism). Then, education might change prefer-
ences and behaviors, by increasing patience and risk aversion. Finally, there is a potential
“school incapacitation” effect that might lead to a direct decrease in crime. Lochner and
Moretti (2004), Machin et al. (2011) and Hjalmarsson et al. (2015) use a school reform
as an exogenous source of variation for an extra compulsory year of schooling and find
strong evidence that education significantly decreases the probability of being involved in
criminal activities.
Meghir et al. (2012) find that the Swedish educational reform introduced in 1962 aimed
at increasing the number of years of compulsory schooling had not only a direct effect in
reducing crime for the men affected by the reform, but also for their children. Anderson
(2014) uses county-level data for the U.S. to show that arrest rates for 16-18 year olds
are significantly lowered by the implementation of minimum age of dropout laws. Luallen
(2006) investigates the impact of school incapacitation on juvenile crime rates by using
teacher strike days as a source of variation of student school attendance and he finds that
schooling significantly decreases juvenile crime.1.
And yet, Ehrlich (1975) suggests that the relation between education and crime may
1For a more comprehensive literature review of the effect of education on crime see Lochner (2011).
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be more complex, since it depends on the way education affects the relative opportunities
available to offenders in different illegitimate activities. In his view, education can be
regarded as an instrument to improve efficiency in the production in both legitimate as well
as illegitimate markets, and we should expect to find lower educated people committing
petty crimes, and more educated ones committing more elaborate crimes (e.g. fraud,
forgery, embezzlement, trade in illegal merchandise, and illegal commercial practices,
etc). In addition, education may increase an offender’s ability to avoid apprehension and
punishment for their crimes. While Ehrlich (1975) examines data relying on an intuitive
model, Lochner (2004) explicitly models the decision to invest in human capital, to work,
and to commit crime. He adopts a human capital framework to explore the relationship
between education and crime and his findings are in line with Ehrlich (1975)’s intuitions.
The predictions of his model are generally supported by the data presented in the empirical
part of his paper where he finds that education is associated with fewer property and
violent crimes but with more white collar crimes (although not significantly).
Lack of individual data on criminal proceeds and education has prevented scholars
from analyzing the effect of education and on the productivity of criminals.2 The only
exception we are aware of is Carvalho and Soares (forthcoming), a recent paper on 230
youngsters working for drug-selling gangs in 34 poor neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro (so
called “favelas”), Brazil. The authors have very detailed information on socioeconomic
factors, like years of schooling, literacy, wages related to drug dealing, involvement in
violence, etc. Their study is not focussed on estimating the returns to education but
in their Mincer wage regressions the coefficient on years of education is not significantly
different from zero. Instead, the coefficient on years of experience ranges between 5 and
10 percent.
2Moreover, the data typically used to study the relationship between criminal participation and ed-
ucation is based on prison records. Inmates might not be a representative sample of all criminals, but
just a selection of the least able, thus underestimating the level of education and its return for common
offenders.
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But, drug selling in a Brazilian favela is likely to require a different set of skills com-
pared to many of the legal and illegal businesses that were run by the mafia in New York
and in other major U.S. cities historically. The involvement of victims in racketeering,
extortions, and fraud adds an additional layer of complexity which is more common in
white-collar crimes. Moreover, many of these businesses were often run together, again,
adding complexity.
Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) investigate the characteristics of members of a gang
located in an inner-city neighborhood in a large, industrial American city. They show that
gangsters’ average wages are only slightly higher than those earned in the legal sector, but
that the distribution of wages is highly skewed and is characterized by enormous wage
differentials between the gangsters at the bottom and those at the top of the criminal
organization. They interpret the decision to join a gang as a tournament, where the
winners will be highly compensated in terms of future wage. But, they have no data on
the educational attainment of gangsters.
This paper also relates to the large literature estimating the private returns to educa-
tion more generally. For several decades, economists have been running Mincer regressions
similar in form to those we present and estimate below, variously using ordinary least
squares (OLS), instrumental variables (IV) and control function techniques to address
estimation issues including ability bias and measurement error. Recent investigations by
Heckman et al. (2003) have found that the Mincer specification, which assumes a linear
relationship between log earnings and years of education and a quadratic relationship be-
tween log earnings and experience, was most appropriate for the period 1940-1950. This
is reassuring for the results presented in this paper and indicates that our estimates can
reasonably be considered to represent the internal rate of return to education.
Ashenfelter et al. (1999) provides a meta-analysis of 27 modern studies estimating the
returns to schooling, focusing mainly on twins and sibling studies where estimates are
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based on within-family variation, and on IV analyses. Returns based on OLS estimation
of Mincer-type regressions tend to average 6-7%, while using IV or a twins sample yields
estimates closer to 9% on average. Their method controls for reporting bias whereby
studies finding insignificant results tend to be underreported, which may be a particular
problem for IV and twin studies given their larger sampling errors. Once they employ
this approach, they conclude that the estimated returns to schooling identified in the
literature do not differ substantively due to differing estimation strategies. This conclusion
is reassuring for us, given that we are limited due to the nature of our historical data in
this study in terms of moving beyond OLS estimations.
Card (2001) surveys the current state of the literature, focusing on IV approaches. He
points out that, even in studies using the most convincing instruments3, the interpretation
of the results must be as the average effect of education on earnings across individuals with
potentially heterogeneous returns to and costs of obtaining education and it also reflects
who was most affected by the instrument, which may not always be representative of the
returns to education of the average person in the population. Given that the returns
may be higher for those at lower levels of education, and that most IV strategies tend to
exploit this margin of exogeneity in attainment (the compulsory schooling and distance to
educational institutions studies for example), it is not so surprising that IV estimates tend
to be larger. This also suggests that producing OLS estimates is still a useful exercise.
Finally, we discuss the smaller literature on education and estimates of its return in
pre-World War II U.S. The historical literature on education has traditionally focused on
plotting the general trend of the rise of educational attainment and public education.4
The general trend during the early twentieth century was a steep upward trajectory in
educational attainment associated with the “High School Revolution”, with some states
3And there is evidence suggesting that some of those studies have used weak instruments, including
quarter of birth, which would bias the estimated coefficients towards OLS, Card (1999), p. 1837.
4See, for example, the large body of work by C. Goldin and L. Katz, including Goldin and Katz
(2008a) and Goldin and Katz (2008b).
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in New England and the Midwest increasing attainment faster than others. By 1940, half
of U.S. youths had attained a high school diploma (Goldin and Katz (2000), p. 786).
Lack of data on wages or income and on educational attainment before 1940 has held
back estimation of the returns to education for earlier dates. Clay et al. (2012) com-
prehensively examine the returns to education over the long run during the period when
compulsory schooling laws were first introduced on a state by state basis and therefore
when they were most relevant. They look at men reporting positive wage income in the
1940 Census and who were impacted by the laws of 1898-1927 and estimate returns to an
additional year of education of 8-9%, using OLS, and 11-14% using IV methods where the
compulsory schooling laws provide a plausible instrument. Heckman et al. (2003) found
that the returns to education in a sample of white men aged 16-64 drawn from the 1940
Census were about 12.5%. Our estimated returns for the comparison groups drawn from
the U.S. Census, including the sample of neighbors, reported below, are very much in line
with existing OLS estimates from the historical literature.
3 The Italian-American Mafia
This section provides some context regarding the Italian-American population and mafia
from the turn of the twentieth century onwards, which will inform our analyses of rates
of educational attainment and measured returns to schooling for these groups.
From 1880 to 1900, 959,000 Italians entered the U.S., and the following two decades
saw a further 3,200,000 Italians make the journey.5 This massive wave of migration to
the U.S. stopped with World War I and the introduction of immigration restriction in the
1920s and, particularly, the Immigration Act of 1924, after which the annual visa quota for
Italians was reduced to 4000. While initially the source locations were found in Northern
Italy, over time Sicily and the South provided a larger proportion of new arrivals, due
5Pretelli (2013), p. 437.
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to labor unrest, population excess and, most of all, agricultural crises and commodity
price shocks.6 Buonanno et al. (2015) have shown how these agricultural problems also
contributed to the rise of the mafia in many parts of Sicily and Southern Italy.
The majority of these immigrants were agricultural workers, with low levels of literacy.
In 1901, about 80 percent of the Sicilian population was illiterate (ISTAT, 2014), and
such rates were likely similar among the negatively selected group of early immigrants
(immigrants tend to be younger and thus more literate but also poorer and thus less
literate). The early immigrants tended to be geographically clustered, with large numbers
living in little “Italies” and, as a group, they maintained their hostility to schooling. The
“Americanization” that might occur in American public schools was perceived as a threat
to their values. For example, Anthony Accardo, Chicago’s boss-of-bosses for almost a half-
century (who has a record in the FBN data), was born in Chicago to Sicilian immigrants.
Both settled in the U.S. in 1905. When Anthony was 14 his parents filed paperwork with
the authorities claiming that he was two years older than he actually was so that he could
leave school and go to work, a common practice (Roemer, 1995). Later, we show that it is
precisely after eight years of schooling, when children are about 14, that the educational
gap between mafia members and their neighbors emerges.
Possibly also because of the educational gap, children of these early immigrants had
a higher tendency to become street gang members in the slums, spoke little Italian, and
worked side by side with criminals from other ethnicities, mainly Jewish and Irish (Lupo,
2009). Several mafia bosses, including Lucky Luciano, Tommaso Lucchese, Vito Genovese,
Frank Costello, etc., were children of these early immigrants. Criminal careers started
quite early– FBN records show that in fifty percent of cases the very first recorded arrest
occurred before the age of 20.
Lured by the criminal successes of the first wave of immigrants, and by Prohibition, the
6Between 1901 and 1913, almost a quarter of Sicily’s population departed for the United States,
Critchley (2009).
11
second wave of immigrants that went on to become mafia bosses were already criminals by
the time they entered the U.S. Charles Gambino, Joe Profaci and others were in their 20s
and 30s when they first entered the U.S., and most came from Sicily. Another reason for
this selection of immigrants was the 1920s fascist crack-down of the mafia, which forced
some of these criminals to leave Sicily. After the second wave of immigration, the Italian-
American mafia became more closely linked to the Sicilian mafia.7 Lucky Luciano became
the head of the entire organization in 1931 and there would be no more mafia wars during
his reign which lasted until 1962– this decreases the problem of sample selection due to
death in our mobster sample.
By 1940, the mafia had a well established government, called “commissione.” The
mafia, the Cosa Nostra (“our thing”), was composed of approximately 25 Families and was
governed by a Commissione of 7-12 bosses, which also acted as the final arbiter on disputes
between Families. The remaining 10 to 15 families were smaller and not part of Cosa
Nostra’s governing body. Each Family was structured in hierarchies with a boss (Capo
Famiglia) at the top (Maas, 1968). These hierarchies allowed the mafia to successfully
expand into a series of legal and illegal activities. Mobsters were involved in racketeering,8
drug trafficking, gambling and bootlegging, but also owned restaurants, drugstores or were
otherwise involved in the food and beverage sector. Real estate, casinos, car dealerships,
loan-sharking and import-export were also common businesses. According to the FBN
files, by 1960 only 32 percent of gangsters had no businesses, while 43 percent had one,
19 percent had two, and the remaining 5 percent had 3, 4, or 5 different businesses.
So, it seems clear that our sample mobsters represent career criminals engaged in
elaborate crimes requiring a complex hierarchy of individuals. Ferrante (2011), a former
member of the mafia associated with the Gambino family, describes these types as follows:
7See Gosch and Hammer (1975).
8Gambetta (1996) views the mafia as a protection agency that in exchange of a fee allows firms to
collude. Alexander (1997) shows evidence of such collusion practices in the 1930 Chicago Pasta market.
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“If we shed our prejudices, we’ll find that accomplished mobsters are just
like top business leaders. The mafia shares the same power structure as any
corporation. A Don is exactly like a CEO, steering the business (or family)
into the future. His capos are middle-managers or department heads, and
his soldiers are employees. Whether corporate or mafia, people who acquire
diplomatic skills, leadership qualities, and the enthusiasm to motivate will
master their respective fields.”
Later, we show that the returns to education for these “business” criminals are, indeed,
quite large, and they drive our general finding of a healthy return to education for mob-
sters.
4 Data
4.1 Mobster and Neighbor Samples
In this section we explain how the dataset was constructed. We searched the manuscript
records of the 1940 U.S. Census of Population for 712 members of the Italian-American
mafia whose details were listed in the 1960 Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) records.9
The records are an exact facsimile of the FBN secret files on American mafia members
who were active in 1960 (FBN, 2007).10 There are no written records about how the
FBN followed mobsters and constructed the network. Through surveillance posts and
undercover agents, the agency was likely discovering previously unknown mobsters by
following known ones. Very active mobsters with many connections are thus likely to be
9In the 1930s, and up to the 1950s, the FBN, which later merged with the Bureau of Drug Abuse
Control to form the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, was the main authority in the fight
against the mafia (Critchley, 2009). The New York Federal Bureau of Investigation had just a handful
of agents assigned to the mafia, while in the same office more than 400 agents were fighting domestic
communists (Maas, 1968).
10The distribution of the year of first arrest of mobsters has almost full support within the range
1908-1960, so one can infer that the data refer to what the authorities knew in 1960.
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over-represented in our dataset. In some specifications, we use information on the network
of connections to control for this sample selection, by reweighting the data in a way that
resembles snowball sampling (see Mastrobuoni (2015)).
We then link these records based on a multitude of variables (first name, surname,
names of family members, the residence address, the year of birth, etc.) by hand to
the 1940 Decennial Census using the genealogical Web site ancestry.com. We face two
selection problems. We can only match mobsters who survived up to 1960 and we can
only gather information on incomes and/or housing outcomes when the mobsters are not
in prison at the time of the Census. A smaller issue is the fact that some mobsters
immigrated to the U.S. after 1940, but we find evidence that, for those we managed to
find on “ancestry.com”, this was only the case for 7 of the 712 potential mobsters, so we
do not consider this to be a big problem.
Between 1940 and 1960, mafia Families were not at war with each other, so the second
selection problem is likely to be more serious. Thirty-two mobsters out of the 414 (7.7
percent) that we matched to the 1940 Census were in prison. One would expect the more
“executive” members of the mafia, the soldiers, to be more likely to face the risks of prison
or death. We have information on education for those spending time in prison, and these
mobsters do indeed have, on average, lower levels of education compared to the ones that
are out of prison (6.8 versus 7.7 years).
Including the 32 inmates, by imputing their incomes or housing values, has little
influence on the estimated returns to education, but we need to keep in mind that this
robustness test cannot be performed for the members who died between 1940 and 1960.11
While we also cannot exclude that a few of these mobsters might not yet have been
part of Cosa Nostra in 1940, this is unlikely to be serious problem. For each mobster
the FBN record contains their criminal history, including the year of first arrest (only 15
percent of mobsters have no arrest record). For 85 percent of mobsters that we match
11The results are available upon request.
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the first arrest happens in 1940 or before.12
Our search achieved a high match rate of almost 57%, matching 414 individuals to their
Census record. This compares favorably with match rates from other studies searching
for individuals in historical Censuses using ancestry.com– our relative success is likely
attributed to the amount of information in the FBN records that we could use to match
to the Census. Using broadly similar search criteria, Collins and Wanamaker (2013)
obtain a 21% match rate when searching for African-American men between the 1910
and 1930 U.S. Censuses, while Abramitzky et al. (2014) report a 19% match rate when
connecting more than one census between 1900 and 1920.
Table 1 compares the characteristics of our final sample (matched and selected based
on age, etc.) with the unmatched or unselected mobsters. The purpose is to highlight
any difference that might influence our results. From the FBN records, we compare the
year of birth, the business criminals indicator, the number of words in the records that
describe a mobster as a top ranked member of the mafia, marital status, the number of
children, whether they resided in New Jersey or in New York and, finally, whether they
had ever been arrested and, if that is the case, the year of their first arrest.
The number of words variable is constructed using more detail from the FBN files,
which contain descriptions of each mobster and their activities. Our “Top ranked cita-
tions” variable sums up the number of mentions of the following words: boss, highest,
most, head, top, high, influential, important, leader, leading, powerful, and representing.
We define “business” criminals as those who are charged with any of the following
offenses: embezzlement, forgery, fraud, counterfeiting, gambling, prostitution, tax evasion,
and bookmaking. “Non business” criminals are all the others. The most common “non
business” crimes are: robbery, murder, weapons offenses, simple assault, larceny, burglary,
drug and liquor offenses. Slightly more than one third of mobsters are business criminals.13
12As a robustness check we can restrict the analysis to these mobsters and the returns to education are
almost identical for the two groups. Results are available upon request.
13Adding liquor and drug offenses to the definition of business criminals does not alter the results.
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The averages tend to be close to each other. Unsurprisingly, given the 20-year differ-
ences between the two data sets, unmatched mobsters tend to be slightly younger (two
years on average). Probably because of this difference they are also less likely to be mar-
ried, and have on average fewer children. Not finding a significant difference in terms of
leadership (top ranked citations) is quite reassuring for our potential sample selection:
mobsters in the two samples appear to have the same visibility and importance in the
organization.
We collected information about mafiosi and their closest neighbors, defined as all
individuals recorded on the same page in the 1940 Census manuscript. Logan and Parman
(2015) use this same strategy to identify neighbors in historical censuses, with the aim
of tracking residential segregation over time. Census enumerators were assigned to one
enumeration district (in most cases and all cases in larger cities) and they were provided
with maps of their district and instructed to visit each house in order so that the Census
cards that survive on ancestry.com show, in almost every instance, households directly
adjacent to each other in their neighborhoods. Only 23 percent of the time in our sample
were people recorded on the same page not living on the same exact street, but even
in these cases they were still living very close by (in adjoining streets, for example, see
Logan and Parman, 2015). A single Census card may contain more than one street, as
the enumerator continued recording families “around the block”. Because of the urban
nature of mobsters, everybody that we identify as their neighbor is living at most one
block away from them.
The advantage of the 1940 Census is that it allows for a search by first and last
names as well as basic demographic characteristics and it was the first U.S. Census to
ask questions at the individual level about highest grade of schooling attained, wage
income, whether any non-labor income was earned in the previous year and migration in
the past five years and it also provides information on the house value or rent paid for
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each household. The resulting database on each mobster provides information on their
background and educational attainment during a period when they were already engaged
in criminal activity (the only possible exceptions being mobsters in our database who were
aged under 18 in 1940), as well as comparable measures of background for a group of their
neighbors. We cleaned the data of typographic errors present on the ancestry.com Web
site, to ensure a large enough sample size for the analyses below. The 1940 Census was
only released to the public, with names, in 2012 and the FBN records were declassified
and published in 2007, so this is the first time that such a dataset linking members of U.S.
organized crime families and their illegal behaviors to earlier information on educational
attainment and family background has been possible. Mastrobuoni (2015) provides more
detail on the FBN source, but it contains information on approximately one quarter of
mafia members in the 1960s.
While some of the neighbors might have been associated with the mafia, most were
probably not. Of our 414 mobsters only in 5 instances did mobsters with different sur-
names share the same Census page with other mobsters: Joseph Filardo and Joseph
Cusamano, Carlo Gambino and Gaetano Russo, Joseph Stracci and John Linardi, Agatino
Garufi and Salvatore Maimone, Vincent Teriaca and Nicholas Bonina. In other words,
only 10 out of 414 known mobsters lived close enough to end up on the same Census page.
Moreover, some of the differences in the characteristics of mobsters and neighbors
suggest that neighbors are indeed less likely to be mobsters. We will see that neighbors
are considerably less likely to be born in Italy (15 percent against 38 percent), they are
also less likely to be employers or to be working on own account (12.95 percent against
31.14 percent) and twice as likely to be working for the government, probably as part of
the New Deal Works Project Administration (9.92 percent against 4.72 percent). We will
also see that they are less likely to underreport their income.
Here is how we selected mobsters and neighbors. Each mobster who, in that year, was
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not spending time in prison (32 out of 414 were incarcerated), was not attending school
(45 out of 382 were still in school), and whose age was above 18 (6 out of 334 were minors)
was then matched one to many with their white male neighbors selected as above and
whose age is within 10 years of the mobster’s age (we also use lower thresholds). The
average number of records on each Census page (independently of race, gender and age)
is 32.5 and never exceeds 40 because of the physical dimensions of the standard Census
cards. In ninety percent of cases there are more than 25 such records. Once the sample
is reduced as outlined above, the average number of neighbors is equal to 6.2.
This gives us a final sample of 311 mobsters and a comparable set of their peers, based
on age, race, gender and place of residence, on which to run our analysis of the returns to
education for criminals versus non-criminals. We firstly discuss summary characteristics
of the samples before proceeding with our main analyses. We also acknowledge that
we are running straightforward Mincer regressions using OLS. But, given that our data
collection strategy allows us to observe mobsters and neighbors, in Section 5 we argue
that the usually cited biases of such an approach should be present for both groups
equally, allowing us to compare outcomes for the two. We additionally present estimates
for broader comparison groups to investigate the validity of our mobster and neighbor
findings.
4.2 Census Data
We draw various samples from the 1940 Federal Census IPUMS 1% sample, and investigate
the returns to education in these samples for comparison with the estimated returns for
mobsters. In line with the characteristics of mobsters, the most comprehensive sample
includes all white men aged between 18 and 60. Then, we further select all U.S.-born men;
all male citizens of the U.S.; all Italian-born men living in the U.S.; all immigrants living
in the U.S.; second generation Italian men (defined as U.S.-born individuals having either
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a mother or father born in Italy). For robustness some specifications restrict further by
age and weight the samples according to the age and location of mobsters across the U.S.
As for mobsters and neighbors, for all of these samples only men who are recorded as
not attending school and being in the labor force are included. We then follow Goldin and
Katz (2000) to multiply topcoded incomes by 1.5 and to construct our measure of poten-
tial experience used in the Mincer regressions below. This potential experience measure
is equal to the minimum of (age-years of education- 7) and (age-15) and it thus reflects
both the usual age of starting education during this period and the fact that historically
a greater proportion of individuals reported implausibly low levels of educational attain-
ment. The education variable for the 1940 Census, used to construct both our potential
experience and education variables, records the highest grade of schooling attained.
In the analyses below we present results for all of these samples. It is not immediately
obvious as to what the correct comparison group for high-level criminals should be, so we
present results from the most general sample (all white men in the U.S.) down to a sample
of white male neighbors using only those on the same Census card as each mobster. The
most relevant comparisons are probably second-generation Italians, Italian immigrants
and the neighbor sample. This is based on the demographics of the samples and the
fact that, both historically and today, there is a high degree of residential clustering so
that neighbors should share characteristics with mobsters and should face the same labor
market and institutional constraints and opportunities.
4.3 Summary Statistics
In the analyses neighbors are always weighted by the inverse of their number ωi = 1/ni,
where the index i identifies mobsters. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for mobsters,
for the matched neighbors, and for the entire sample of white men aged between 18 and
60 (the Appendix Tables A2 and A3 cover the remaining comparison groups).
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Mobsters are considerably more likely to report no income (partly because they are
more likely to be self-employed), and the ones they report are on average 20 percent lower
than for matched neighbors. This is likely to be misreporting because it is incompatible
with the value of the house where they live. Mobsters are more likely to own a house
(33 percent vs. 32 percent), and their house is on average worth about 10 percent more
compared to those of their neighbors and 65 percent more than the average white men
of similar age and similar state of residence. Moreover, even mobsters who are renting
tend to spend slightly more than their closest matches. Mobsters’ neighbors, instead, are
quite similar to the average white man, especially when the overall sample is weighted
according to the distribution of age and state of residence of mobsters (and neighbors),
the only exception being that they live in more expensive housing.
We note that the Census instructions were very clear that enumerators should explain
that information was not allowed to be passed on to the authorities and they faced a
penalty of up to a $1000 fine or 2 years imprisonment if they revealed any confidential
information. Enumerators also swore to not accept answers that they believed to be
false and to assert their authority in entering people’s homes and finding the correct
information. Each enumerator covered only 1-2 blocks and reported their work to a
supervisor. It seems that these measures were successful enough for mobsters to be
comfortable with being entered on a Census card. We still acknowledge that they are
unlikely to have reported all of their income from all sources. In only 6 cases do we have 2
observations for a mobster’s income– this comes from cases where we have the 1940 Census
record and we were also able to find a prison admission register for the individual (but
they were not in prison in 1940).14 2 of these cases were from the 1920s, but looking at
those in the 1930s suggests that mobsters do underreport income. It is difficult, however,
14Admission registers which are searchable by name exist on ancestry.com for Sing Sing and
Clinton prisons, both in New York state. They were consulted in December 2015, and
can be found at the following urls: http://search.ancestry.co.uk/search/db.aspx?dbid=8922 and
http://search.ancestry.co.uk/search/db.aspx?dbid=9023.
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to tell if the 1940 income is reported much lower because of the time spent in jail or
because of mobsters exercising more caution in responding to Census officials than prison
officials.
Since underreporting might bias our results we will conduct our analysis considering
three different measures of their economic status: i) income, ii) an index based on the
value of their house and their monthly rent payments (called “housing value”), and iii)
whether or not they own the house in which they live. Yet, the observed differences
in education might be part of the story. Mobsters have, on average, one less year of
education compared to their neighbors: 7.80 against 8.75. Their educational attainment
is even lower compared to the average U.S. male aged 18-60 who had 9.05 years. In line
with the anecdotal evidence outlined above, Figure 1 shows that this difference is mainly
driven by differences in the likelihood of entering high school versus entering the labor
market, when children are about 14.
In terms of other socioeconomic characteristics, mobsters are more likely to be for-
eigners (30 percent are aliens, while 25 percent have been naturalized compared to 22
percent and 18 percent respectively for the group of neighbors), and are more likely to
have been born in Italy. They are more likely to be married but they have, on average,
fewer children and live in smaller households. Geographic mobility is low for both groups:
85% of mobsters and 86% of their neighbors have lived in the same house for at least five
years.
Figures 2 and 3, show the cumulative distributions of log income and log housing
quality for mobsters and the main comparison group, neighbors. The housing quality
measure is explained in more detail in the next section, but it is one measure of residential
status constructed from the Census information on either rents paid (where an individual
is a renter) or housing value (where an individual is a homeowner). The raw plots for
mobsters and neighbors show that mobsters’ reported log income is typically lower than
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the log income of neighbors. The opposite is true when looking at housing value. This is
likely driven by income being underreported, an issue we return to in the next sections.
Now that we have introduced the data sources and some summary statistics for our
samples of mobsters, neighbors, and others drawn from the 1940 Census, the following
sections will outline the methodology and results, facilitating a comparison of the returns
to education in legitimate and illegitimate activities.
5 Returns to Education
In order to establish the role that education plays in shaping earnings inside organized
crime organizations, we follow the long tradition of Mincer-type regressions, estimated
with OLS. The main drawback of this approach is the possibility of ability bias- that an
omitted variable, such as unobserved ability, may be correlated with both log income and
years of education. Our datasets do not allow us to utilize the IV approaches common in
the literature, as outlined in the Literature Review section. However, we believe that the
bias should be similar for the mobster sample and for the comparison samples of neigh-
bors, Italians, second-generation Italians, U.S.-born and U.S.-citizen men. The existing
literature has shown that OLS estimates are mostly biased downwards relative to those
found using IV methods, so our results below may be considered lower bound estimates.
We thus interpret our reported returns to education as reflecting both the true return to
schooling and the component that reflects the fact that ability is correlated with years of
schooling attained.
Below, we also address the problem of under-reporting of mobsters’ income. We also
present some specifications that control for the fact that we have a selected sample of
criminals. By using the FBN data from 1960, we are starting with a sample of highly
successful and well-connected mobsters and, since the FBN data allowed us to identify
the connectedness and importance of each individual, we reweight some estimations to
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control for the fact that well-connected people are more likely to be in the sample, making
it non-representative of the typical mobster.
5.1 Main Results
As is customary, we transform all outcomes into logarithms. There is an additional
advantage of taking logarithms: if mobsters are only reporting a fraction of their income
µYi, in logarithms this fraction will be separated from the outcome log µ+ log Yi = α+ yi
and can be captured by the constant term (or by the other regressors). Taking logarithms
we exclude all incomes that are zero. We will show that this is likely to improve the
precision of the estimates as zero incomes do not appear to be genuinely zero but are
rather driven by misreporting.
Next, we measure the returns to education for mobsters and neighbors. We follow the
long tradition of Mincer regressions and use linear models, where the log of y is regressed
on years of education and potential experience.15 In order to allow errors to be correlated
across mobsters residing in the same city standard errors are clustered at the city level.
The results for the (parsimonious) regressions of income when controlling only for
potential experience and years of education are in Columns 1 and 5 of Table 3 for mobsters
and our main comparison group, neighbors. Columns 2-4 and 6-8 introduce more controls
(we label these our baseline specifications). Table 6 presents the returns to education for
alternative comparison groups using both the parsimonious and baseline specifications.
Later, we show that controlling for potential experience squared does not alter our main
conclusions. We will also show that excluding the variables that could potentially be
endogenous to income (marital status, number of household members, and number of
children) does not alter the results.
15Heckman et al. (2003) use Census data for the period 1940-1990 to estimate flexible internal rates of
return to schooling. They account for non-linearity in schooling, non-separability between schooling and
work experience, etc. While they do find evidence of such non-linearities, the 1940 and 1950 Censuses
provide support for Mincer’s original, more basic, model.
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The returns to education and potential experience are equal to 8.5 and 4.2 percent
respectively, for mobsters, and 10.2 and 3.9 percent for neighbors. These are comparable
to the 8-9% reported in the Clay et al. (2012) OLS model for data from the 1940 Census.
It suggests that education has a similar payoff in illegitimate and legitimate activities
when comparing groups living in close proximity and who face the same opportunities in
legal and illegal work in 1940.16
For mobsters, the returns to education drop by 0.4 and 1.1 percentage points when
adding other socioeconomic variables as well as city or state fixed effects. For their
neighbors, adding socioeconomic variables reduces the returns by 0.9 percentage points,
while city or state fixed effects have almost no effect on the estimates. Mobsters and
neighbors have very similar returns to potential experience in all specifications.
As for the coefficients on the other controls, there are quite substantial differences
between mobsters and neighbors. Mobsters born in Italy and those that have been nat-
uralized tend to report much smaller incomes, while those that are immigrants (aliens in
the Census) report higher incomes. For neighbors, none of these differences are significant.
To cope with the potential measurement error bias in income discussed above we
employ two different strategies: we impute mobsters’ income using neighbors’ income and
we estimate Mincer regressions using housing quality as the dependent variable.
Taking these strategies in turn, Table 4 displays results using a variety of imputation
strategies to deal with missing and zero income data for mobsters. Imputation was used
for all mobsters (the only exception is column 3 where we only impute zeros and missing
data). The first column repeats the result from Table 3, Column 4, the city fixed effects
specification. The second column imputes incomes using housing values and housing rents,
which are arguably more difficult to misreport and are available for almost all mobsters.
16Given the low geographic mobility of individuals in the 1940 Census, demonstrated by the “location
in 1935” variable, it is even likely that mobsters and neighbors may have attended the same schools. This
will not be true for mobsters who were born in Italy and moved to the U.S. after their schooling was
completed.
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If yn/hn is the ratio between incomes and housing values for neighbors, we impute log
income for mobsters using log(yˆm) = log(yn/hn ∗hm). Using mobsters’ housing values the
returns to education are almost unchanged, as shown in Column 2.
Starting with Column 3, we use neighbors’ incomes as a proxy for mobsters’ incomes.
Not surprisingly, given the potential mismatch the returns to education tend to be smaller
though still significant. In particular, in the “Only missing and zeros” column only the
missing incomes are imputed (log(yˆm) = log(yn) when ym is missing or zero) using neigh-
bors’ incomes weighted by the inverse sum of standardized absolute differences between
mobsters and neighbors in the observable characteristics used in Table 3. In other words,
more weight is given to neighbors that have similar characteristics to the mobsters.17
In the “All” column, the unweighted neighbors’ income is used for all mobsters’ income,
and such fully imputed incomes are weighted in the “Weighting” column. In columns
“Nationality” and “Nationality&Age”, only neighbors of the same nationality (Italian or
not), and whose age difference is smaller than 5 years, are used. These tighter matches
deliver returns to education that are closer to the baseline results.
Turning to the second strategy, housing outcomes might be an alternative, possibly less
distorted, proxy for long-term income or wealth. The housing outcomes for each household
are almost never missing in the 1940 Census, for mobsters and others. Intuitively, since
enumerators could see the asset in question, it’s unlikely that responders would be able
to under-report the value of housing. We compute Housing Quality, an index for housing
quality that converts monthly rents into a house value. We used the ratio of house values
to rents at the city level from the neighbor sample to convert mobster and neighbor rental
17More formally, if dik = |xmik−xnik| is the distance between the mobsters’ and the neighbors’ observable
characteristic k = 1, ...,K, then we define the standardized distance to be:
di =
K∑
k=1
dik − d¯k
SD(dk)
.
The weight for observation i, wi, is simply equal to the inverse of the distance (wi = 1/di).
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values into housing quality proxies.18 This index is then used as the dependent variable.
Table 5 shows that, even when using housing values, the returns to education and
experience are quite comparable for the two groups. If anything, the returns seem to be
larger for mobsters than for neighbors in the first two specifications (Columns 1 and 2). As
in Table 3, for mobsters city fixed effects tend to reduce the coefficients on education (see
Column 3). The reason may be that city fixed effects capture 57 percent of the variability
of education for mobsters, as shown in the last row of the table. Mobsters appear to sort
into cities based on their level of education more than their neighbors. In other words, a
successful mobster tends to be based in big cities that offer more opportunities and have
more expensive houses.19
We now place the mobster results in context by looking at other comparison groups
beyond neighbors. We estimate returns for different groups: all men aged 18-60, men born
in the U.S., US citizens, immigrants, men born in Italy, and second-generation Italian men.
Although the counterfactuals that are plausibly the closest ones to our treatment group
(mobsters) are that of men born in Italy and those with at least one parent born in Italy,
we also use the other comparison groups to have other interesting benchmarks.
Table 6 shows the returns to education for the different comparison groups for the
entire U.S., with Panel B weighting by mobsters’ age and state of residence. Returns are
highest for those born in the U.S. (11.8% in the weighted expanded specification) followed
closely by U.S. citizens (10.4%). Second-generation Italians have an estimated return of
6.8%, immigrants 4.8% and lastly Italian immigrants 3.2%. These compare to 7.4% for
mobsters using the same specification, putting them closest to the second-generation
Italians. This group is likely a very close comparison in terms of both unobservable
characteristics and market opportunities and so this result highlights that the returns to
18The rent ratio distribution was first censored at the top and bottom 5% marks.
19Table A1 in the Appendix shows returns to education when using home-ownership as the dependent
variable. Education significantly affects the decision to buy a house only for neighbors and not for
mobsters. The coefficient on education is always positive for mobsters but it is significant only in the
specification with state fixed effects.
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education in legal and illegal activities are very similar. Taken together, these results
suggest that the low returns to investment in education for Italian immigrants in the
legal labor market may partially explain both the low investment made by mobsters in
education and their decision to become involved in organized crime.
That returns to education for mobsters are larger than for immigrants, and especially
compared to the Italian immigrants (as shown by comparing results in Table 6 to those
in Table 3) may not be surprising for a number of reasons. The mobster sample contains
a variety of types of individuals– both immigrants who completed at least some of their
education abroad and those born in the U.S. and individuals descended from Italian
immigrants. This means that mobsters had more U.S.-specific education and training
compared to the immigrant sample as a whole and that may partly explain the higher
returns to their more relevant, U.S. education. It may also reflect the lack of opportunities
in the legal labor market for Italian immigrants. Italians at the turn of the century
were very concentrated in certain low-status occupations and had little access to union
protections and this may have continued through 1940.
Finally, we re-estimate mobster returns to education, taking into account the impor-
tance of mobsters within the mafia organization. The FBN records contain information
about the closest criminal associates. This allows us to build the network of mobsters.
We deal with the incompleteness and non-randomness of such a network by modeling
law enforcement’s surveillance and detection of mafia mobsters as a Markov chain. More
active, more important, and more connected mobsters are more likely to be noticed and
tracked. This means that observed gangsters are likely to be more connected than the
average one. If the only low-educated mobsters to come to the attention of authorities and
entered into FBN files are those who happen to be quite successful, this would probably
lead to downward biased estimates of the relationship between education and mobster
outcomes.
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In order to produce a representative sample of mobsters, “sampling” weights should
underweight highly connected mobsters and vice versa. This kind of sampling resembles a
procedure that is used to sample hidden populations, called snowball sampling (a detailed
description of how to construct the sampling weights can be found in Mastrobuoni (2015)).
The weighting scheme gives less weight to individuals with high numbers of connec-
tions. This should control for selection into our mobster sample, and does not seem to
affect the results regarding the returns to education. Column 1 of Table 7 presents results
from specifications that are the same as Table 3, Column 4. Column 2 of that table repro-
duces the same specification but applies a Markov-Chain weighting on mobsters. Here,
we assume that mobsters who were more senior and well-connected within the hierarchy
of the mafia were those who were reported in the FBN files around 1960 and we want to
control for this selection into our mobster sample. The next columns in the table show
the effect of years of education on the likelihood of being self-employed (Columns 3 and
4 are estimated with the linear probability model with a dummy for being self-employed
as the outcome). Then, Columns 5 and 6 report results using importance of a mob-
ster within the organization as an outcome measure. The results show that education
had a positive effect on both the likelihood of running a business in 1940 and of being
more important/successful in the mafia organization in 1960, whether or not we use the
Markov-Chain weighting.
In Table 8 we perform some robustness checks to be sure that our results are not biased
by the particular specification we used. Column 1 show the estimates of our baseline
regression. In Column 2 we use log hourly wage (a variable created dividing income by
the total working hours per year, when the information is available) as our dependent
variable. Returns to education are lower than in the baseline, but still significant. The
results differ little when we control for a squared term of potential years of experience
(Column 3) and when limiting the sample to neighbors whose age gap with mobsters is
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under 5 years (and not 10 as in the baseline) (see Column 4). We do this to explore the
robustness of our results and to compare mobsters to an even more relevant comparison
group. The results are also robust to focussing on individuals above age 22 (Column 5),
an age at which individuals in the 1940s had usually completed their studies. We also
estimate returns to education without using family controls (married, number of people
in the households and number of children) that are potentially endogenous to education,
but including all the other regressors as in the main specification (Columns 4 and 8 in
Table 3). Again, we find results that are in line with our main specification. The gap
of 1-2 percentage points between mobster and neighbor returns from Table 3 is mostly
replicated in these robustness checks.
To make sure that our estimates do not differ too much when including people report-
ing zero income, the final robustness check uses a Poisson model. The returns to education
for mobsters is still (weakly) significant with a lower coefficient (about 6 percent). This is
consistent with the observed misreporting of zero income. Mobsters who report incomes
of zero have on average higher levels of education, and live in more valuable housing. The
opposite is true for neighbors.
In summary, the main message is that there was a substantial return to education
for mafia members based on their information and activities in the 1940 Census. The
magnitude of their returns is very similar to samples of their neighbors and to a more
general sample of second-generation Italians. Immigrants, especially Italians, seem to
have had very low returns to education in the legal labor market while those enjoying
the highest returns were the U.S.-born and U.S. citizen groups. This is likely due in part
to occupational clustering, with immigrants being found mostly at the bottom of the
occupational ladder and finding it difficult to move upwards in the legal labor market.
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5.2 Mechanisms
We discussed above that we believe the returns to education that we calculate for our
mobster sample is so similar to the returns in legitimate activities found in the previous
literature and in our various comparison samples presented in Tables 2 and 5 because
mobsters, especially those who have been a member of the organization for a long time
and are well connected, engage in crimes that require cognitive, organizational and even
social skills of the type that are developed in formal education.
We are able to test this explanation more thoroughly, using information from the FBN
files on the crimes with which individuals have been charged. In particular, we compare
returns to education between business and non-business criminals, as defined above.
Our findings are reported in Table 9, with income as the outcome in Columns 1-4 and
housing quality as the outcome in Columns 5-8. Even columns report returns to education
and experience for these business criminals, while odd columns represent returns for all
others. Returns to education are at least 9 percentage points higher for business criminals,
and their returns to experience are at least 5 percentage points higher in the income
regressions. These results are very consistent with our narrative that mobsters have
surprisingly high returns to education because of the complex nature of the crimes and
criminal network that they are involved in. Our main results can be considered an average
of the results for these two types within the mobster group. This finding suggests that,
in general, those engaged in complex crimes and white-collar crimes more generally may
enjoy a high return to education. Conversely, the results for the non-business criminals
within the mobster group reveal quite low returns to education, not very different to the
immigrant and Italian immigrant returns to legitimate activities shown in Table 6. These
are also closer to the low (but insignificant) returns reported by Carvalho and Soares
(forthcoming) for their sample of young, lowly Rio gang members.
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6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the link between education and economic outcomes (income and
housing values) for members of the Italian-American mafia, as well as for a sample of
their neighbors and other comparison samples of white men living in the U.S. and located
in the 1940 Census files. We focus on mobsters who were listed in a 1960 FBN publication
and link these data with those of the 1940 Decennial Census.
Consistent with a career choice model, we find that the distribution of years of ed-
ucation of mobsters is first order stochastically dominated by the distribution of their
neighbors. We also find that schooling has a positive return not only in legitimate ac-
tivities, but also in illegitimate ones. In fact, mobsters’ returns lie in between those for
Italian and other immigrant groups (on the lower end) and those for U.S.-born individ-
uals and U.S. citizens (on the higher end). While this might appear counterintuitive, a
model of human capital investment where the working life is shorter (in this case because
of expected prison time, injuries or death), predicts larger annual returns to education.
This is because the marginal year of schooling will have to provide larger annual returns
for somebody whose working life is shorter, as there will be less time to make up for the
investment over the lifetime.20
The mafia business is usually a mix of legal and illegal activities. For illegal activities
like racketeering, extortion, loan sharking, etc. skills acquired in education, like the
ability to process numbers, to think logically, organize complicated logistics systems etc.
are likely to increase with education and seem necessary for success in these mafia roles.
Moreover, often times loan sharking would allow mobsters to acquire legitimate businesses
convenient for money-laundering purposes. Returns to education in such activities are
likely to be large too. The FBN records allowed us to identify the types of crimes mobsters
were charged with and investigate returns to education and experience for “business”
20This rests on the assumption that education either signals productivity or contributes to the produc-
tivity of mobsters.
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criminals, who were involved in the types of activities just described, and others, who
were not charged with such crimes. The results are fully consistent with our narrative and
show returns to education for business criminals that are of the same order of magnitude
as for the U.S.-born and U.S. citizens.
We conclude that, at least for career criminals operating at a high level in complex
organizations who perpetrate serious crimes, education is quite valuable.
This study has focused on a very specific organized crime group, the mafia. Whether
these results hold up in other criminal organizations, with more or less complex business
models, is a possible avenue of future research. Similarly, this paper is silent on the value
of education for criminals at lower ranks within a larger criminal organization and, given
the small sample size and unstable results in Carvalho and Soares (forthcoming), the
returns for such individuals remain uncertain.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for mobsters
Unmatched Matched
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. t-stat
Year of birth 1912.17 8.15 1910.23 6.93 1.94 -3.92
Business criminal 0.23 0.42 0.31 0.46 0.07 2.30
Top ranked citations 0.83 1.01 0.87 1.05 -0.04 0.61
Married 0.71 0.45 0.80 0.40 -0.08 2.19
Divorced 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.11
# of children 0.90 1.32 1.17 1.58 -0.27 2.32
No arrests 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.02 -0.75
First arrest 1932.99 10.88 1931.94 10.61 1.05 -1.21
Residing in NY 0.41 0.49 0.48 0.50 -0.06 1.47
Residing in NJ 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25 -0.01 0.78
Notes: We compare the characteristics from the FBN records of mobsters that were matched with the
1940 CENSUS and were selected (nobs = 330) with those that were not matched, or were matched but
could not be selected (nobs = 471). The last column tests the difference between the two means.
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Table 3: Mincer Regressions Using Yearly Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log-Income of Mafia members log-Income of Neighbors
Yrs. of education 0.085*** 0.081*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.102*** 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.090***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Potential yrs. of experience 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.039*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Married 0.232 0.181 0.247 0.478*** 0.462*** 0.453***
(0.182) (0.181) (0.194) (0.074) (0.067) (0.048)
Born in Italy -0.432 -0.573** -0.835*** -0.015 -0.032 -0.020
(0.271) (0.234) (0.159) (0.084) (0.077) (0.073)
Alien citizen 0.916** 1.150*** 1.365*** -0.044 -0.071 -0.029
(0.376) (0.331) (0.228) (0.078) (0.077) (0.088)
Naturalized citizen -0.662** -0.764*** -0.771*** 0.018 0.042 0.002
(0.274) (0.277) (0.247) (0.071) (0.076) (0.078)
# of HH members -0.085 -0.139** -0.187*** -0.012 -0.025 -0.031
(0.075) (0.055) (0.029) (0.026) (0.021) (0.020)
# of children 0.150 0.226* 0.348*** -0.027 -0.009 0.001
(0.153) (0.115) (0.052) (0.029) (0.025) (0.022)
Same residence last 5 yrs. -0.047 0.024 0.079 0.070 0.057 0.017
(0.180) (0.143) (0.088) (0.115) (0.118) (0.126)
Constant 5.363*** 5.525*** 5.779*** 5.867*** 4.844*** 4.898*** 4.976*** 5.027***
(0.444) (0.630) (0.613) (0.726) (0.161) (0.205) (0.193) (0.208)
State fixed effects Y Y
City fixed effects Y Y
Observations 180 180 180 180 1381 1381 1381 1381
R-squared 0.083 0.131 0.256 0.466 0.206 0.265 0.298 0.383
Notes: There are a total of 311 mobsters in the data. The number of observations refer to the
unweighted data. There are a total of 180 mobsters with positive incomes. Mincer wage regressions
with clustered (by city) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Mincer Regressions Using Imputed Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log-Income
Imputation: None From housing Only missing and zeros All Weighting Nationality Nationality&Age
Yrs. of education 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.063*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.061*** 0.068***
(0.020) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
Potential years of experience 0.028*** 0.045*** 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.058*** 0.061***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Imputed zero incomes 0.354**
(0.172)
Other Xs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
City fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 180 1,304 1,631 1,380 1,380 902 569
R-squared 0.466 0.213 0.370 0.284 0.273 0.296 0.345
Notes: This table shows returns to education using seven different imputation strategies for income (one
for each column of the table). Imputation was used for all mobsters (the only exception is column 3
where we only impute zeros and missing data).
“None”: this is our baseline regression with city fixed effects (see Column 4 in Table 3).
“From housing”: we use the ratio between income and housing value (and rent) for neighbors at city
level (yn/hn) to impute income for all mobsters (log(yˆm) = log(yn/hn ∗ hm)).
“Only missing and zeros”: missing data on income as well as the zeros are imputed using neighbors’
incomes weighted by the inverse sum of standardized absolute differences between mobsters and
neighbors in the observable characteristics used in Table 3. More weight is given to neighbors that have
similar characteristics to the mobsters (see footnote 16 for more details).
“All”: the unweighted neighbors’ income is used for all mobsters’ income (not just for the missing
values and the zeros).
“Weighting”: the imputed incomes in the “All” column are weighted using the same weights as in
Column 3.
“Nationality”: only neighbors of the same nationality (Italian or not) are used to impute mobsters’
income.
“Nationality&Age”: only neighbors of the same nationality and whose age difference is smaller than 5
years are used to impute mobsters’ income. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Mincer Regressions Using Housing Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log-Housing of Mafia members log-Housing of Neighbors
Yrs. of education 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.034** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.043***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Potential yrs. of experience 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.015** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.012***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Married 0.010 0.094 0.109** 0.128***
(0.075) (0.069) (0.043) (0.042)
Born in Italy -0.213** -0.235* -0.156* -0.216**
(0.100) (0.126) (0.091) (0.100)
Alien citizen 0.207 0.182 0.083 0.108
(0.153) (0.216) (0.100) (0.084)
Naturalized citizen -0.183 -0.139 -0.051 -0.043
(0.154) (0.210) (0.095) (0.072)
# of HH members -0.046* -0.041 0.016 0.019
(0.027) (0.029) (0.016) (0.014)
# of children 0.067* 0.089** -0.039 -0.033
(0.040) (0.039) (0.036) (0.034)
Same residence last 5 yrs. -0.007 0.387** -0.097 -0.099
(0.194) (0.178) (0.083) (0.060)
Constant 7.599*** 7.781*** 7.684*** 7.642*** 7.624*** 7.777***
(0.295) (0.210) (0.281) (0.221) (0.135) (0.159)
State fixed effects Y Y
City fixed effects Y Y
Observations 304 304 304 1,800 1,800 1,800
R-squared 0.059 0.263 0.505 0.054 0.234 0.413
Explained variability of education 0.570 0.375
Notes: There are a total of 311 mobsters in the data. The number of observations refer to the
unweighted data. Weighting, there are 311 observations in both groups. Mincer wage regressions with
clustered (by city) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Returns to Education for Various Subsamples
Sample Average Model Returns to education
Income Years of educ. Income Housing
Panel A: Unweighted
(1) All aged 18-60 857.7 9.053 Parsimonious 0.116*** 0.121***
(2) Baseline 0.105*** 0.108***
(3) Born in the US 847 9.348 Parsimonious 0.131*** 0.144***
(4) Baseline 0.116*** 0.120***
(5) US citizen 860.5 9.168 Parsimonious 0.120*** 0.127***
(6) Baseline 0.108*** 0.111***
(7) Immigrants 927.6 7.105 Parsimonious 0.057*** 0.058***
(8) Baseline 0.049*** 0.051***
(9) Italians 785.4 5.321 Parsimonious 0.030*** 0.034***
(10) Baseline 0.029*** 0.033***
(11) Second generation Italians 776.4 9.256 Parsimonious 0.069*** 0.059***
(12) Baseline 0.064*** 0.062***
Panel B: Weighted by mobsters’ age and State of residence
(13) All aged 18-60 1081 9.691 Parsimonious 0.098*** 0.073***
(14) Baseline 0.089*** 0.078***
(15) Born in the US 1086 10.11 Parsimonious 0.118*** 0.093***
(16) Baseline 0.106*** 0.094***
(17) US citizen 1090 9.822 Parsimonious 0.104*** 0.078***
(18) Baseline 0.093*** 0.082***
(19) Immigrants 1059 8.022 Parsimonious 0.048*** 0.044***
(20) Baseline 0.040*** 0.040***
(21) Italians 878 6.254 Parsimonious 0.032*** 0.035***
(22) Baseline 0.031*** 0.035***
(23) Second generation Italians 850.3 9.152 Parsimonious 0.068*** 0.049***
(24) Baseline 0.061*** 0.052***
Notes: Each row corresponds to two separate linear regressions, using either income or
housing quality as dependent variables. The parsimonious regressions control for just
potential years of experience while the baseline regressions adds city fixed effects as well
as all the socioeconomic controls (as in Column 4 of Table 3). The weighted regressions
use the mobsters’ distribution by age and states to reweight the data. Mincer wage
regressions with clustered (by city) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Mincer Regressions for Additional Outcomes, Weighting for Sampling Design
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log-income Self-employed Top ranked citations
Years of education 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.018** 0.030*** 0.058** 0.037*
(0.020) (0.027) (0.009) (0.008) (0.024) (0.019)
Potential yrs. of experience 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.014** 0.017** 0.028*** 0.035***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Married 0.247 0.372 0.027 0.015 -0.000 0.193
(0.194) (0.371) (0.081) (0.052) (0.147) (0.149)
Born in Italy -0.835*** -0.378 0.024 0.101 -0.159 -0.294
(0.159) (0.297) (0.121) (0.124) (0.195) (0.211)
Alien citizen 1.365*** 0.508 0.158 0.195 0.604* 0.095
(0.228) (0.486) (0.221) (0.264) (0.321) (0.471)
Naturalized citizen -0.771*** -0.337 -0.119 -0.315 -0.562* -0.077
(0.247) (0.503) (0.161) (0.203) (0.302) (0.417)
# of HH members -0.187*** -0.113** -0.013 -0.005 -0.023 0.045
(0.029) (0.043) (0.011) (0.020) (0.044) (0.052)
# of children 0.348*** 0.352*** 0.008 -0.010 0.069 -0.077
(0.052) (0.099) (0.027) (0.045) (0.061) (0.087)
Same residence last 5 yrs. 0.079 -0.095 0.131 0.080 0.220 0.241
(0.088) (0.198) (0.102) (0.074) (0.143) (0.148)
Constant 5.867*** 5.723*** -0.210 -0.338* -0.156 -0.458
(0.726) (0.399) (0.146) (0.193) (0.343) (0.389)
Markov Chain weighting No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 181 181 344 344 344 344
R-squared 0.466 0.431 0.469 0.551 0.331 0.375
Average dependent variable 6.758 6.762 0.332 0.323 0.908 0.754
Notes: All Mincer-style regressions are estimated using linear models, and control for city fixed effects as
well as for all the controls listed in Table 3. The variable “Top ranked citations” counts the number of
words in the records that describe a mobster as a top ranked member of the Mafia, while self-employed
is a dummy that is equal to one if individuals declare to be self-employed in the 1940 Census. The
Markov-chain weighting gives more weight to mobsters who in the FBN records appear to have few
connections. Clustered (by city) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Robustness Mincer Wage Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log-Income
Panel A: Mafia Members Baseline log(Income/Tot.Hrs) w. Exp. sq. ∆age ≤ 5 age ≥ 22 No family controls Poisson
Mafia yrs. educ. 0.081*** 0.067*** 0.082*** 0.100*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.063**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025)
Potential yrs. of experience 0.039*** 0.022 0.041*** 0.055*** 0.035** 0.046*** 0.036**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.009) (0.017)
Pot. yrs. of experience squared -0.001**
(0.000)
Observations 180 128 180 99 166 180 291
R-squared 0.131 0.124 0.137 0.206 0.097 0.418
log-likelihood -189382
Panel B: Neighbors Baseline log(Income/Tot.Hrs) w. Exp. sq. ∆age ≤ 5 age ≥ 22 No family controls Poisson
Neighbors yrs. educ. 0.093*** 0.067*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.088*** 0.101*** 0.088***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Potential yrs. of experience 0.028*** 0.020*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.021*** 0.039*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Pot. yrs. of experience squared -0.001***
(0.000)
Observations 1380 1123 1380 814 1278 1380 1782
R-squared 0.256 0.160 0.277 0.262 0.193 0.199 .
log-likelihood -141845
Notes: There are a total of 311 mobsters in the data. The number of observations refer to the
unweighted data. Weighting, there are 311 observations in both groups. Mincer wage regressions with
clustered (by city) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 9: Mincer Wage Regressions by Type of Criminal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log-Income log-Housing Quality
“Business” criminals No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Years of education 0.063*** 0.112 0.056*** 0.161* 0.050** 0.141** 0.052*** 0.140**
(0.021) (0.070) (0.019) (0.089) (0.020) (0.058) (0.018) (0.067)
Potential yrs. of experience 0.026*** 0.079*** 0.025** 0.117*** 0.022** 0.044** 0.030*** 0.032**
(0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.015)
Other Xs and State fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 132 50 128 50 153 58 149 58
R-squared 0.033 0.358 0.232 0.669 0.059 0.149 0.419 0.338
Notes: “Business” criminals have committed at least one of the following crimes: embezzlement,
forgery, fraud, counterfeiting, gambling, prostitution, tax evasion, and bookmaking. “Non business”
crimes include, among others: robbery, murder, weapons offenses, simple assault, larceny, burglary, drug
and liquor offenses. Mincer wage regressions with clustered (by city) standard errors in parentheses:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Mincer Regressions Using Home-Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Homeowner (Mafia) Homeowner (Neighbors)
Yrs. of education 0.043 0.044 0.075** 0.006 0.046*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.048***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.024) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Potential yrs. of experience 0.031*** 0.063*** 0.073*** 0.065*** 0.018*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.024**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Married -0.843*** -1.046*** -1.039*** -0.259*** -0.264*** -0.342***
(0.218) (0.250) (0.342) (0.089) (0.090) (0.093)
Born in Italy -0.536** -0.605** -0.450 0.240 0.305* 0.352*
(0.227) (0.277) (0.295) (0.156) (0.160) (0.207)
Alien citizen 0.381 0.412 0.039 -0.595*** -0.610*** -0.574***
(0.439) (0.569) (0.789) (0.207) (0.217) (0.202)
Naturalized citizen -0.066 -0.189 0.138 0.332** 0.464*** 0.437***
(0.389) (0.505) (0.734) (0.160) (0.178) (0.143)
# of HH members 0.022 0.005 -0.011 0.091*** 0.114*** 0.111***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.046) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036)
# of children 0.023 0.053 0.019 -0.073 -0.115** -0.129**
(0.078) (0.079) (0.069) (0.058) (0.053) (0.059)
Same residence last 5 yrs. 0.180 0.241 0.583 -0.046 0.088 0.382**
(0.241) (0.238) (0.556) (0.123) (0.129) (0.149)
Constant -1.322*** -1.446*** -1.660*** -5.259*** -1.216*** -1.538*** -1.154*** -5.851***
(0.306) (0.338) (0.471) (0.450) (0.326) (0.263) (0.247) (0.347)
State fixed effects Y Y
City fixed effects Y Y
Observations 311 311 308 237 1,892 1,892 1,892 1,822
log-likelihood -192.9 -179.8 -160.9 -115.5 -190.5 -186.1 -173.5 -146.9
Notes: There are a total of 311 mobsters in the data. The number of observations refer to the
unweighted data. Weighting, there are 311 observations in both groups. Mincer wage regressions with
clustered (by city) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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